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In January 2018, the European Commission initiated a restriction procedure on
microplastics in cosmetic products. This article deals with the legal implications of a
European Union (EU) restriction under the Regulation on the Registration, Evalu-
ation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) in relation to the right to
regulate in the EU and in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
article argues that in the aftermath of harmonization, the legal scope for EU Mem-
ber States is dependent on the definition that will be adopted as regards microplas-
tics under REACH: the wider the scope of the restriction, the more probable it is
that Member States’ action is restrained. In the context of WTO rules, similar con-
siderations apply as regards the scope of the definition: the wider the scope of an
EU ban, the more demanding it will be to satisfy the requirements under the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade. Providing scientific evidence is instrumental, as
there is little room for the precautionary principle in both regimes.
1 | INTRODUCTION
In line with the European Union (EU) Plastics Strategy published in
January 2018, the European Commission has requested the Euro-
pean Chemical Agency (ECHA) to prepare a dossier for restricting
microplastics in certain products. According to the Court of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in EFTA Surveillance Author-
ity v Kingdom of Norway,1 the Commission has to start this proced-
ure in case of a national measure restricting the use and placing on
the market of chemical substances by a Member State. Following its
notification in November 2016, France has, as the first EU Member
State, implemented a restriction on the use of microplastics in cer-
tain cosmetic and personal care products, the so‐called rinse‐off
products for exfoliation or cleansing. The French ban was communi-
cated to the Commission according to Directive 2015/1535, which
requires EU Member States to notify ‘any draft technical regulation’
in order to assess the effects of the proposed regulation on the mar-
ket.2 France also notified the World Trade Organization (WTO)
according to Article 10(6) of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement).3 In both notifications, the ban on microplas-
tics in rinse‐off cosmetic products – products that are rinsed off
immediately after use – was justified with a reference to interna-
tional and European obligations regarding the status of the marine
environment. Other Member States have announced similar legisla-
tion. Furthermore, non‐EU Member States, such as the United
States, Canada, South Korea and New Zealand, have either notified
or have already in force regulations which ban certain microplastics
in certain cosmetic products.
In this article, we discuss the issues that may arise as a result of
these national bans and a possible EU ban on microplastics with
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respect to the right to regulate. Technical regulations may be incon-
sistent with the principle of free movement of goods within the EU
as well with respect to the WTO obligations on international trade.
In the absence of an international environmental agreement on plas-
tic pollution, and in particular on microplastics, countries turn to uni-
lateral measures, even though this kind of pollution may only be
effectively tackled on a global scale.4 We are well aware of the fact
that intentionally added microplastics are only a fraction of the prob-
lem of (micro)plastic pollution. Nevertheless, we will limit our
research to the restriction of microplastics in cosmetic products, as
one of the most frequently adopted regulations on microplastics.
Before going into the implications for the internal market and inter-
national trade law of an EU ban on microplastics, we first discuss
the national bans of microplastics in cosmetic products. Different
definitions of microplastics are used and restrictions apply to differ-
ent categories of products. We also refer to the developments at
the EU concerning the restriction dossier currently prepared by
ECHA. We acknowledge that an EU‐wide ban on microplastics is far
from being adopted. However, the implications of the possible EU
ban for Member States’ regulatory autonomy in the future should be
analysed given that the scientific knowledge on microplastics is still
developing and further regulatory measures may be needed.
We then deal with the legal implications in relation to the intern-
al market of the EU. The restriction dossier has to be compiled
according Article 69(1) of the Regulation on the Registration, Evalu-
ation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),5 and
requires a comprehensive assessment of the scientific evidence for
regulating microplastics at the EU level. REACH aims at complete
harmonization, and Article 128 of REACH gives to the Member
States and EFTA Member States the right to regulate substances
where requirements have not yet been harmonized under the
REACH restrictions procedure. But after harmonization Member
States have limited space to prohibit or restrict the use of a sub-
stance in a product regulated by REACH and in the EU in general. A
similar provision can also be found in the Cosmetics Regulation
under Article 9.6 However, since the Cosmetics Regulation does not
apply to restrictions for environmental reasons, the article concen-
trates on REACH only. Questions may arise in case different defin-
itions of microplastics are used and when restrictions are placed on
different categories of cosmetic products. Would a Member State
still be able to ban microplastics in leave‐on products if a European
ban is limited to rinse‐off products?
The last section explores the right to regulate in relation to WTO
law, in particular the TBT Agreement. WTO case law has, in several
decisions, stipulated the right to regulate, which should be balanced
with the objective of trade liberalization. Would a European ban on
microplastics stand the test under the TBT Agreement if challenged?
We evaluate the requirements for a WTO‐compliant technical meas-
ure, in particular with an EU ban on microplastics in mind.
2 | NATIONAL BANS ON MICROPLASTICS
IN COSMETIC PRODUCTS
The existence of microplastics was first described in the journal
Science in 2004, revealing that microscopic plastic fragments were
widespread and increasing in the marine environment.7 In the years
since, scientists published an abundance of evidence regarding
microplastics, from measuring the presence and quantity to the
ingestion of microplastics by animals and presence in food chains.8
Intentionally added microplastics, in particular those in rinse‐off
products, are generally discharged in wastewater streams, in most
parts of the world directly into surface water, but also after treat-
ment in wastewater facilities.9 The release of intentionally added
microplastics in cosmetic products in the environment is most effect-
ively prevented by banning them from these products.10
Table 1 outlines the initiatives countries have taken so far. In
2015, the first national regulation on microplastic pollution was
adopted. Following legislative initiatives in several states,11 the US
Microbead‐free Waters Act of 2015 prohibits the manufacture and
sale of rinse‐off cosmetic products that contain ‘microbeads’.12 A
microbead is defined as ‘any solid plastic particle that is less than
five millimetres in size and is intended to be used to exfoliate or
cleanse the human body or any part thereof’.13 The Act also pro-
vides that further regulation of microbeads in rinse‐off cosmetic
products by federal states is not permitted and should be revoked if
already in place. In this regulation, the distinction between rinse‐off
and leave‐on products was introduced, suggesting that primarily
rinse‐off products would lead to disposal in waterways.14
4See on the issue of unilateral trade measures, jurisdiction and extraterritoriality: H Horn
and PC Mavroidis, ‘The Permissible Reach of National Environmental Policies’ (2008) 42
Journal of World Trade 1107; B Cooreman, Global Environmental Protection through Trade: A
Systematic Approach to Extraterritoriality (Edward Elgar 2017).
5Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of
Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/
45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC)
No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/
EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC [2006] OJ L396/1 (REACH).
6Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
November 2009 on Cosmetic Products [2009] OJ L342/59.
7RC Thompson et al, ‘Lost at Sea: Where Is All the Plastic?’ (2004) 304 Science 838, 838.
8For an overview, see AL Andrady, ‘The Plastic in Microplastics: A Review’ (2017) 119 Mar-
ine Pollution Bulletin 12.
9HA Leslie, ‘Review of Microplastics in Cosmetics’ (Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam 2014) 21, 27.
10CM Rochman et al, ‘Plastic Debris and Policy: Using Current Scientific Understanding to
Invoke Positive Change’ (2016) 35 Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 1619, 1623.
11Illinois, Colorado, Maine, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Indiana, Maryland, Connecticut, Califor-
nia and New York passed legislation at the state level. See D Xanthos and TR Walker,
‘International Policies to Reduce Plastic Marine Pollution from Single‐use Plastics (Plastic
Bags and Microbeads): A Review’ (2017) 118 Marine Pollution Bulletin 17, 23; JP McDevitt
et al, ‘Addressing the Issue of Microplastics in the Wake of the Microbead‐free Waters Act
– A New Standard Can Facilitate Improved Policy’ (2017) 51 Environmental Science and
Technology 6611, 6613.
12Section 2(a) Microbead‐free Waters Act of 2015.
13ibid.
14Committee Report, H. Rept. 114–371 – Microbead‐free Waters Act of 2015 (7 December
2015).
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TABLE 1 National regulation on microplastics, in force or notified
Country
WTO
notification
EU
notification Product category Definition of microplastics
United States – Microbead‐free
Waters Act of 2015
(in force)
– – Rinse‐off cosmetic
products
Microbead: any solid plastic particle that is less
than 5 mm in size and is intended to be used
to exfoliate or cleanse the human body or any
part thereof
South Korea –
Proposed amendments to the
‘Regulation on Safety Standards
etc. of Cosmetics’
G/TBT/N/KOR/672
G/TBT/N/KOR/706
– Cleansing products,
dental cleansing
products
Microbead: less than or equal to 5 mm in size
Taiwan –
Restrictions on the Manufacture,
Import, and Sale of Personal
Care and Cosmetics Products
Containing Plastic Microbeads
(in force)
G/TBT/N/TPKM/249 – Cosmetics used for
washing hair, bathing,
face‐washing and soap;
toothpaste
Microbead: solid plastic particles used for
exfoliation or cleaning of the body wherein
the scope of particles’ diameter is smaller than
5 mm
Canada –
Microbeads in Toiletries
Regulations
(in force)
G/TBT/N/CAN/501 – Toiletries, meaning any
personal hair, skin,
teeth or mouth care
products for cleansing
or hygiene, including
exfoliants
Microbead: plastic microbeads that are ≤5 mm
in size, any plastic particle, including different
forms such as solid, hollow, amorphous and
solubilized
France –
Decree prohibiting the placing
on the market of rinse‐off
cosmetic products for exfoliation
or cleansing that contain solid
plastic particles
(in force)
G/TBT/N/FRA/170 2016/543/F Rinse‐off cosmetic
products for exfoliation
or cleansing
Solid plastic particles, with the exception of
particles of natural origin not liable to persist
in, or release active chemical or biological
ingredients into the environment or to affect
animal food chains
New Zealand –
Waste Minimization
(Microbeads) Regulations 2017
G/TBT/N/NZL/77 – Wash‐down cosmetic
products; cleaning
products
Microbead: a water‐insoluble plastic particle
that is less than 5 mm at its widest point
Sweden –
Draft Regulation prohibiting the
placing on the market of rinse‐
off cosmetics that contain solid
plastic particles which have been
added for exfoliating, cleaning or
polishing purposes
G/TBT/N/SWE/132 2017/284/S Rinse‐off cosmetic
products
Solid particles of plastic which are 5 mm or less
in size in any dimension and which are
insoluble in water
United Kingdom –
The Environmental Protection
(Microbeads) Regulations 2017/
2018
(England, Wales, Scotland,
Northern Ireland)
G/TBT/GBR/28
G/TBT/GBR/29
G/TBT/GBR/30
G/TBT/GBR/32
2017/353/UK
2018/42/UK
2018/48/UK
2018/208/UK
Rinse‐off personal care
products
Microbead: any water‐insoluble solid plastic
particle of less than or equal to 5 mm in any
dimension
Belgium –
Draft Sector Agreement to
support the replacement of
microplastics in consumer
products
– 2017/465/B Not settled
Italy – Draft technical regulation
banning the marketing of non‐
biodegradable and non‐
compostable cotton buds and
exfoliating rinse‐off cosmetic
products or detergents
containing microplastics
G/TBT/N/ITA/33 2018/258/I Exfoliating rinse‐off
cosmetic products and
detergents
Water insoluble solid plastic particles of 5 mm
or less, referring to definition in Commission
Decision (EU) 2017/1217 of 23 June 2017
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South Korea was the first country to notify the WTO of its pro-
posed prohibition of microbeads in cosmetic products. In the notifi-
cation database on technical barriers, South Korea announced a ban
on microbeads in rinse‐off products in October 2016 and in tooth-
paste in February 2017.15 Taiwan followed with notification for new
legislation with a reference to the US Microbead‐free Waters Act,
using more or less the same definitions.16
Canada notified the WTO regarding the proposed Microbeads in
Toiletries Regulations covering products for cleansing or hygiene and
defines microbeads as ‘plastic microbeads that are ≤5 mm in size’.17
Different forms of particles are included, such as solid, hollow,
amorphous and solubilized, as well as different functions. Microbe-
ads are distinguished from secondary microplastics, as being manu-
factured for a specific purpose and application. This definition
diverges from commonly used definitions, which describe microbe-
ads often as solid particles with the function of exfoliating and
cleansing. The Canadian ban puts microbeads on the list of toxic
substances of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,18
and prohibits the adding of microbeads in toiletries, for cleansing or
hygiene, limiting them, effectively, to rinse‐off products.
The first EU Member State to adopt a ban was France, which
banned the sale of rinse‐off cosmetic products for exfoliation or
cleaning that contain solid plastic particles.19 The ban excludes par-
ticles from a natural origin providing that they are not persistent and
that they do not affect the food chain. The French ban does not
specify the size of the particles resulting in all solid plastic particles
being banned, also those larger than 5 mm. The ban was notified
both to the Commission, under the 2015/1535 notification proce-
dure,20 and to the WTO.21
Sweden has also announced a ban prohibiting rinse‐off cosmetic
products that contain plastic particles which have been added for
exfoliating, cleaning and polishing purposes.22 Plastic particles are
defined as solid particles of plastic which are 5 mm or less in size
and insoluble in water.23 The Swedish notification refers explicitly to
the US and French regulations and it seems that Sweden has
attempted to follow the definition in these regulations.
New Zealand notified the WTO in March 2017 of its proposed
ban on microbeads in ‘wash‐down’ cosmetic products.24 In October
2017, New Zealand announced that the proposed ban will be
extended to include cleaning products, such as household, car and
industrial cleaning products.25 A microbead is defined as ‘a water‐
insoluble plastic particle that is less than 5 mm at its widest point’,26
thereby tying in with the regulation in the United States and
Canada.27 However, the extension to other, non‐cosmetic, wash‐off
products is novel.
The United Kingdom has announced four legislative proposals,
for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Environmen-
tal Protection (Microbeads) Regulations 2017 are proposed under
the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and follow the US regula-
tion, both regarding the definition of microplastics and concerning
the category of products.
Belgium has notified a voluntary sector agreement to phase out
microplastics, initially from rinse‐off cosmetic products, and gradually
from cleaning and maintenance products.28
The latest notification came from Italy, proposing to phase out
microplastics in exfoliating rinse‐off cosmetic products and deter-
gents by January 2020.29
As an EU restriction on microplastics is being prepared by the
ECHA, and expected to be published in January 2019, we can only
speculate on the definition of microplastics. ECHA has adopted a
working definition, reading ‘any polymer‐containing solid or semi‐solid
particle having a size of 5 mm or less in at least one external dimen-
sion’, though acknowledging that this definition is likely to evolve.30
Although most legislation adheres to the definition that was
adopted by the United States – any solid plastic particle that is less than15Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification G/TBT/N/KOR/672’ (6 October
2016) and ‘Notification G/TBT/N/KOR/706’ (1 February 2017).
16Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification G/TBT/N/TPKM/249’ (14 October
2016), attachment for English text of legislation: <https://members.wto.org/crnattachme
nts/2016/TBT/TPKM/16_4322_00_e.pdf>.
17Microbeads in Toiletries Regulations SOR/2017‐111, amending the Canadian Environmen-
tal Protection Act, 1999 (1 January 2018) <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/
SOR-2017-111/index.html>.
18Section 64, on Toxic substances, of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,
reads: ‘For the purposes of this Part and Part 6, except where the expression “inherently
toxic” appears, a substance is toxic if it is entering or may enter the environment in a quan-
tity or concentration or under conditions that:
(a) have or may have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the environment or its
biological diversity;
(b) constitute or may constitute a danger to the environment on which life depends; or
(c) constitute or may constitute a danger in Canada to human life or health.’
Toxic substances are listed in Schedule 1 of the Act.
19Loi n° 2016‐1087 du 8 août 2016 pour la reconquête de la biodiversité, de la nature et
des paysages, TA n° 803 <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/dossiers/biodiversite.
asp>.
20Council Directive (EEC) 83/189 of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provi-
sion of information in the field of technical standards and regulations [1983] OJ L109/8;
Technical Regulation Information System, ‘Notification Number 2016/543/F’ (12 October
2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/barriers-to-trade/tris_en>.
21Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification G/TBT/N/FRA/170’ (30 November
2016).
22Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification G/TBT/N/SWE/132’ (6 July 2017);
Technical Regulation Information System, ‘Notification Number 2017/284/S’ (30 June 2017)
<https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/barriers-to-trade/tris_en>.
23Förordning (1998:944) om förbud m.m. i vissa fall i samband med hantering, införsel och
utförsel av kemiska produkter, Svensk författningssamling 1998:944 <https://www.riksdage
n.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/forordning-1998944-om-forb
ud-mm-i-vissa-fall_sfs-1998-944>.
24Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification G/TBT/N/NZL/77’ (8 March 2017).
25Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification G/TBT/N/NZL/77/Add.1’ (9 Octo-
ber 2017).
26Waste Minimisation (Microbeads) Regulations 2017, Order in Council (4 December 2017)
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz>.
27Ministry for the Environment, ‘Cabinet Paper: Prohibiting the Sale and Manufacture of
Wash Off Products Containing Plastic Microbeads’ (August 2017) <http://www.mfe.govt.
nz/node/23631>.
28Technical Regulation Information System, ‘Notification Number 2017/0465/B’ (2 October
2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/barriers-to-trade/tris_en>.
29Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification G/TBT/N/ITA/33’ (22 June 2018);
Technical Regulation Information System, ‘Notification Number 2018/258/I’ (6 June 2018)
<https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/barriers-to-trade/tris_en>.
30ECHA, ‘Call for Evidence and Information on the Intentional Uses of Microplastic Particles
in Products of Any Kind: Background Note’ (March 2018).
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5 mm in size and is intended to be used to exfoliate or cleanse the
human body or any part thereof – we can see variations. Canada expli-
citly includes hollow, amorphous and solubilized particles, with different
functions, while France does not set a size limit. Most bans apply to
rinse‐off cosmetic products, but New Zealand extends the ban to clean-
ing products. The EU has declared that it will investigate all relevant
products, including leave‐on cosmetic products, such as make‐up and
sunscreen, and also cleaning products and products for agricultural and
industrial use. In this article we will focus on microplastics in cosmetic
products only. The definition of microplastics as well as the category of
products is of crucial importance for determining what the level of har-
monization is after the adoption of an EU ban. Would there be room for
deviation, for example, by extending the definition to all synthetic poly-
mers, solid or not? And would Member States be able to apply a restric-
tion on leave‐on cosmetic products? These kinds of issues are also
relevant for the test whether the EU restriction would be in accordance
with WTO law. If an EU restriction would depart from solid plastic par-
ticles and rinse‐off cosmetic products, to more encompassing regulation,
would it pass the test of Article 2(2) TBT Agreement?
3 | IMPLICATIONS OF AN EU BAN ON
MICROPLASTICS ON THE REGULATORY
AUTONOMY WITHIN THE EU
Any future EU ban on microplastics under REACH will harmonize
completely the conditions of manufacture, placing on the market and
use of microplastics covered by REACH.31 This results from the aim
of the harmonization measure, namely guaranteeing undistorted
trade between Member States.32 Thus, after the adoption of a final
decision under Article 128(2) REACH to restrict microplastics in cos-
metic products, the manufacture, placing on the market and use of
microplastics in contravention to the EU harmonization measure will
be prohibited.33 This raises the question what will be the conse-
quences of an EU‐wide ban on microplastics for individual Member
States. Are Belgium, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom en-
titled to maintain in force their current national restrictions on
microplastics? Can an individual Member State prohibit microplastics
in different forms, including hollow, amorphous and solubilized par-
ticles, if the EU ban covers only solid plastic particles that are 5 mm
or less and water insoluble?34 Or can a Member State adopt a
national ban prohibiting the use of microplastics in leave‐on cosmet-
ics products if the EU ban prohibits them only in rinse‐off cosmetic
products? These kinds of questions are likely to arise in the future,
given the fact that much knowledge on the human health and envir-
onmental impacts of microplastics is still lacking. Moreover, at least
some Member States seem to be active in regulating chemicals at
the national level.35 For example, it has been argued that France and
Denmark are in the belief that they are still allowed to regulate
chemicals if they consider the measures taken on the basis of
REACH as insufficient.36 Especially France seems not to limit itself
to dealing with emergencies and has, for instance, adopted a manda-
tory nanomaterial reporting in the absence of a Union‐level registra-
tion system.37 In turn, the Commission and the Court have
traditionally adopted a strict interpretation of derogations from the
four fundamental freedoms under the EU treaties.38
However, after an eventual adoption of the harmonization meas-
ure on microplastics, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU)39 and REACH would leave some scope for Member
States’ regulatory action. First, the Member States remain competent
for those microplastics that are not covered by REACH. Second,
Member States have the possibility to derogate from the common
harmonization measure under certain specific circumstances. The
applicable derogation clauses are found in Articles 114 TFEU and
129(1) REACH. In relation to these clauses, the Court has confirmed
in Lapin luonnonsuojelupiiri that Member States are free to decide to
which derogation provision they wish to resort to.40 The following
subsections consider the legal scope left for Member States’ action
under these derogation clauses. We start by considering the concept
of harmonization, after which the possibilities for Member States to
maintain in force their current national restrictions on microplastics
in cosmetic products are analysed. Finally, we establish the possibil-
ities of the Member States to lay down further restrictions on
microplastics in cosmetic products in the future to enable a higher
protection for the environment.
3.1 | The concept of harmonization
Before considering in more detail Member States’ possibilities for
derogation, we first look at the concept of ‘harmonization’. This is
because the scope for Member States’ action is largely based on the
harmonization measure adopted under REACH. In particular, two
issues arise in this context: the stage at which harmonization takes
place and the extent to which the manufacture, use and placing on
the market of microplastics is harmonized.
The stage at which harmonization takes place affects the legality
of national regulatory measures on microplastics: after harmonization
has taken place, no contradictory measures may exist at the national
level. In this regard, the EFTA Court in the EFTA Surveillance Author-
ity v Kingdom of Norway case held that the requirements for
31REACH (n 5) recital 90 and arts 44, 67(1) and 128(1); see also JP Montfort et al, ‘Nano-
materials under REACH: Legal Aspects’ (2010) 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation 51, 60.
32Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union [2012] OJ L326/13 (TEU) art
28.
33REACH (n 5) art 67(1) REACH; EFTA Surveillance Authority v Kingdom of Norway (n 1)
paras 81 and 84.
34See, for different definitions, Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limit-
ed, ‘Intentionally Added Microplastics in Products: Final Report’ (October 2017) 218–219.
35N Herbatschek, L Bergkamp and M Mihova, ‘The REACH Programmes and Procedures’ in
L Bergkamp (ed), The European Union REACH Regulation for Chemicals: Law and Practice
(Oxford University Press 2013) 152.
36L Bergkamp and M Penman, ‘Conclusions’ in Bergkamp (n 35) 422.
37See <https://www.r-nano.fr/?locale=en>.
38Case C‐41/93, France v Commission (PCP), ECLI:EU:C:1994:196 para 24.
39Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ
C326/01 (TFEU).
40Case C‐358/11, Lapin luonnonsuojelupiiri, ECLI:EU:C:2013:142 para 37.
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manufacture, placing on the market or use mentioned in Article
128(2) REACH are harmonized only when a final decision to restrict
the substance has been issued under Article 68 REACH.41 Thus, the
current national restrictions on microplastics are in line with REACH,
although they remain subject to the fundamental freedoms provi-
sions in Article 34 TFEU.
The extent to which harmonization has taken place is a more
complex issue and closely related to the definition that will be
adopted for microplastics by REACH. This is because the definition
determines the range of substances covered by the REACH prohib-
ition and, accordingly, the ‘scope’ of the prohibition. For example,
the scope of a prohibition covering only solid microplastics is nar-
rower than the scope of a prohibition covering also those that are
water soluble. The same may apply for the categories to which the
restriction pertains. In our opinion, the scope of harmonization will
also depend on the decisions that have been made during the
restriction procedure. If a form of microplastic or a certain category
of products has explicitly been excluded from restriction during the
procedure, we may assume that harmonization has taken place for
these forms of microplastics and categories of products. Since ECHA
has announced it will investigate all forms of microplastics and all
products with intentionally added microplastics, an explicit decision
can be expected. We can imagine that the underlying reasoning of
exclusion of forms of microplastics or certain products from the
restriction might also affect the scope of harmonization.
3.2 | Member States’ right to maintain in force
their current restrictions
In the aftermath of harmonization, Member States are under the
duty to determine whether their national measures are compliant
with the possible future REACH ban on microplastics.42 The conse-
quences for the Member States having in force restrictions on the
manufacture, use and placing on the market of microplastics in cos-
metic products will depend on whether the national measure falls
within the scope of the EU ban on microplastics. Of course, issues
only arise when restrictions diverge.
A national ban will be absorbed in case the national measure falls
within the EU restriction and the EU ban is wider than the national
measure. This would be the situation for most national bans, if an
EU ban restricts also other forms of microplastics than solid ones or
if an EU ban restricts also detergents and leave‐on cosmetic prod-
ucts and not only those that are rinsed off. In those situations, the
EU ban would be wider than the national bans and, for that reason,
the national regulations will be replaced by the EU ban.
If a Member State comes to the conclusion that the national meas-
ure does not fall within the scope of the harmonization, the Member
State in question is entitled to maintain in force its restriction on
microplastics. This is outlined by Article 128(2) REACH, which pro-
vides that Member States may maintain in force and introduce
national rules to protect workers, health and the environment in cases
where REACH does not harmonize the requirements on the manufac-
ture, placing on the market or the use. In this case, the scope of har-
monization becomes essential. If an EU ban limits the restriction on
microplastics to only solid plastic particles used to exfoliate or cleanse
in rinse‐off cosmetic products, would all other microplastics and prod-
ucts that do not fall under the restriction be harmonized? While we
cannot predict the outcome of the restriction procedure, we presume
it is essential that a restriction measure on microplastics should expli-
citly determine which microplastics and products it intends to harmon-
ize and thus should define the scope of harmonization.
If we, however, assume that the EU ban does harmonize the regu-
lation on all microplastics, issues may arise when national regulation is
more stringent. In that situation, a Member State may be entitled to
rely on Article 114(4) TFEU, which gives the Member State the possi-
bility to maintain in force its current national provisions on the
grounds of environmental protection. The Court has, so far, adopted a
soft approach with regard to the conditions for measures taken prior
to harmonization and held that Article 114(4) TFEU does not entail ‘a
requirement that the applicant Member State prove that maintaining
the national provisions which it notifies to the [C]ommission is justified
by a problem specific to that Member State’.43 However, at the same
time the Court has held that although a Member State is explicitly
required to put forward scientific evidence only in case of Article
114(5) TFEU, similar considerations apply also in case of Article 114(4)
TFEU.44 In case of notifications made under Article 114(4) TFEU, the
Court has, nevertheless, again taken a lenient approach so that Mem-
ber States are allowed to apply for a derogation on the basis of differ-
ent standards than those adopted at the Union level.45 Therefore, on
the basis of the Commission decisions and case law it seems that the
current Member States having in place restrictions on microplastics
have a reasonable probability of success in notifying more far‐reaching
restrictions under Article 114(4) TFEU. This conclusion finds support
from the statistics: in the period between 1987 and 2014, there were
22 requests under Article 114(4) TFEU of which the Commission
approved 16.46 Of the remaining requests, four were rejected, one
was declared inadmissible and one was withdrawn.47
3.3 | Member States’ right to regulate after the
adoption of an EU ban
3.3.1 | The safeguard clause under REACH
The first possibility for a Member State desiring to provide a higher
level of protection for the environment in case of microplastics is to
41EFTA Surveillance Authority v Kingdom of Norway (n 1) para 84.
42Case 7‐234/04, Commission v the Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2007:335 para 60.
43Case C‐3/00, Denmark v Commission (Danish Additives), ECLI:EU:C:2003:167 para 59.
44ibid para 62.
45ibid para 63; see I Maletic, The Law and Policy of Harmonisation in Europe's Internal Market
(Edward Elgar 2013) 115.
46E Vos and M Weimer, ‘Differentiated Integration or Uniform Regime? National Deroga-
tions from EU Internal Market Measures’ in B de Witte et al (eds), Between Flexibility and
Disintegration: The Trajectory of Differentiation in EU Law (Edward Elgar 2017) 312.
47ibid.
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rely on Article 129(1) REACH. This provision requires that the pur-
pose of the measure is to respond to an urgent situation to protect
human health or the environment. To act, a Member State is
required to inform the Commission, ECHA and the other Member
States, and give reasons for its decision in addition to submitting the
scientific or technical information on which the measure is based.
Regarding the practical possibilities of success under Article
129(1) REACH, so far, only one application for a derogation under
the safeguard clause of Article 129(1) REACH has been put forward.
In August 2013, France applied for a derogation on the basis that it
considered that there were justifiable grounds for urgent action to
protect the public from exposure to ammonia that was released from
ammonium salts contained in cellulose wadding insulation materials
used in buildings.48 The Commission authorized France to ban those
materials until July 2015, when the ban was replaced by an EU‐wide
prohibition.49 The Commission based its decision predominantly on
the information that was submitted by France and conducted only a
brief consultation with other Member States and stakeholders about
the matter.50 It accepted as evidence of a risk to human health the
registered incidents by the national poison centres, complaints that
were submitted by the professional association of producers of cellu-
lose wadding insulation and the concentration measurements of the
French authorities. According to the Commission, the measurements
proved that the levels of exposure exceeded the reference toxicolog-
ical values for safe long‐term exposure.51 Regarding the condition of
urgency, the Commission considered that the interests of protecting
human health at a high level and achieving fast harmonization of the
internal market made the situation urgent.52
Although it seems that a lenient approach was applied by the
Commission as regards the request for derogation, it has to be noted
that several people were already intoxicated since November 2011
and about 150 complaints had been brought by professional associ-
ations.53 Consequently, special circumstances were present, and it
can be argued that it would have been irresponsible on the part of
the Commission not to accept the application for a derogation given
that the adverse effects on human health had already materialized
on various occasions. Accordingly, more cases are needed in order
to draw conclusions on Member States’ likelihood of success in the
case of microplastics under Article 129(1) REACH. We can conclude,
however, that if serious human health impacts come into effect, Art-
icle 129(1) REACH can be successfully invoked. Whether this also
applies to serious environmental effects caused by microplastics
remains to be seen.54
Also, although there exists a possibility for derogation under
REACH, the probability that a Member State will in fact engage in
such an action seems small. This is because of the requirement that
a Member State must produce a restriction dossier.55 Statistics
demonstrate that the efforts by Member States to produce those
dossiers have been very disparate: for instance, in the period
between 2009 and 2017 only 18 restriction dossiers were submitted
by Member States; in 2017, only one new dossier was received from
a Member State.56 Accordingly, Member States’ restriction activity
has remained very low. Difficulty in nominating ‘suitable’ substances
for restriction, the complexity of the restriction dossier and the sub-
stantial resources and staff needed accordingly are mentioned as
reasons.57 Consequently, the compiling of a restriction dossier might
prevent Member States from resorting to Article 129(1) REACH also
in the case of microplastics due to the complexity of the substance
and multiplicity of uses.
3.3.2 | Derogating on the basis of Article 114(5)
TFEU
The second possibility for Member States is to rely on the deroga-
tion mechanism in the harmonization provision in Article 114 TFEU,
formerly Article 95 of the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity (EC Treaty).58 Under Article 114(5) TFEU, a Member State must
fulfil the following four cumulative conditions:59 first, there has to
be new scientific evidence; second, that evidence must relate to the
protection of the environment; third, the action must be taken on
the grounds of a problem specific to the notifying Member State;
and, fourth, the problem must arise after the adoption of the
harmonization measure.60 Accordingly, there are more conditions to
be fulfilled by Member States under Article 114(5) TFEU than under
Articles 114(4) TFEU and 129(1) REACH. In addition to the strict
wording of the Article 114(5) TFEU conditions, we discuss three dif-
ferent factors in the analysis of the Commission decisions and in the
case law that render it difficult for Member States to meet the con-
ditions of Article 114(5) TFEU.
48Commission implementing decision of 14 October 2013 authorising the provisional
measure taken by the French Republic in accordance with Article 129 of Regulation (EC)
No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) to restrict the use of
ammonium salts in cellulose wadding insulation materials [2013] OJ L275/52 para 1.
49Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1017 of 23 June 2016 amending Annex XVII to Regu-
lation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the
Restriction, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) as regards inor-
ganic ammonium salts [2016] OJ L166/1.
50Commission implementing decision of 14 October 2013 (n 48).
51ibid para 7.
52ibid para 8.
53ibid para 7.
54As Rochman and colleagues point out, knowledge in the field of microplastics is ‘arguably
still in its infancy, and more science … is crucial’. Rochman et al (n 10) 1624.
55REACH (n 5) art 129(3).
56ECHA, ‘General Report 2017’ (April 2018) 56 <https://echa.europa.eu/documents/
10162/3048539/FINAL_MB_03_2018_%282%29_General_Report_2017_MB49.pdf/d6c665
cc-8c84-d33f-2f82-fa148e366f5d>.
57S Vaughan, EU Chemicals Regulation: New Governance, Hybridity and REACH (Edward Elgar
2015) 193; ECHA, ‘Report on the Operation of REACH and CLP 2016’ (May 2016) 108.
58Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C352/33.
59Case C‐512/99, Commission v Germany (Man-made Mineral Fibres), ECLI:EU:C:2003:40 para
81.
60See Commission Decision 2008/62/EC relating to Articles 111 and 172 of the Polish Draft
Act on Genetically Modified Organisms, notified by the Republic of Poland pursuant to Art-
icle 95(5) of the EC Treaty as derogations from the provisions of Directive 2001/18/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the deliberate release into the environment
of genetically modified organisms [2008] OJ L16/17 para 45.
260 | KENTIN AND KAARTO
The first factor having an impact on the scope for action of the
Member States under Article 114 TFEU is the restrictive interpret-
ation by the Commission and the Court of the requirement of new
scientific evidence. A prime example is provided for by the Germany
Organostannics case when Germany claimed that the pollution levels
were higher than what earlier research had proved.61 However,
according to the Commission this constituted already existing infor-
mation as the studies were already available at the time the Direct-
ive was being prepared.62 On the basis of the Commission decision
it has been argued that the Commission requires there to be evi-
dence of new problems or of the fact that the problem was of a dif-
ferent order than what the earlier studies had indicated.63 Thus, in
the case of microplastics, Member States should bring forward evi-
dence of new problems caused by microplastics or evidence that the
environmental impact of microplastics has a different magnitude
than what studies established at the time the regulation was
adopted. Moreover, the Court has confirmed in Land Oberösterreich
and Austria that the Commission has discretion when it chooses the
experts to evaluate whether the condition of new scientific evidence
has been met.64 In this regard, the Court has approved the practice
by the Commission to reject a request when a scientific body has
come to the conclusion that a report produced by a Member State
does not contain ‘unusual or unique ecosystems’.65 Due to this con-
firmation, it will be challenging for Member States to fulfil the
requirement of new scientific evidence under Article 114(5) TFEU in
the case of microplastics. This is particularly so where the evidence
put forward by the Member State conflicts with the opinion of the
EU committee or agency.66
What is more, the precautionary principle, which is closely linked
to the assessment of new evidence and new situation under Article
114(5) TFEU, seems to be of little help for Member States: there has
been a strict insistence on the fulfilment of the conditions for dero-
gation.67 In this regard, both the Commission and the Court are of
the opinion that despite the relevance of the principle in assessing
new evidence, both the problem and evidence must be new before
the principle comes into play.68 This means that it is likely that a
Member State will not succeed in relying on the principle in the
context of microplastics when it comes to the conditions of new sci-
entific evidence and new problem.
The second factor affecting the Member State's legal scope is
the interpretation by the Commission and the Court of the
requirement that a problem is specific to the applicant Member
State and arises after the adoption of the harmonization measure.
The issue raising concern here is that the stance adopted in rela-
tion to the condition implies an onerous burden on Member
States. In order to meet the condition, the mere desire to protect
the environment is not enough: the notifying Member State must
be able to demonstrate that the problem is specific for the Mem-
ber State concerned due to, for example, the high population
density of the Member State or its geological circumstances.69
However, it is still unclear what the comparative standard is. At
least the Commission seems to have adopted the standard which
requires scientific data on, for instance, ‘for the Member State
compared with data for other Member States or a Community
average’.70 The Commission has even taken a worldwide approach
to the condition in some cases.71 This stance implies a very
restrictive analysis. A similar line of reasoning has been adopted
by the Court of First Instance in the Dutch Emissions case, in
which it maintained that Article 95(5) EC Treaty, now Article
114(5) TFEU, ‘excludes the possibility of national provisions being
introduced based upon it which derogate from harmonized rules in
order to deal with a general environmental danger in the Commu-
nity’.72 Thus, the Member States are not allowed to impose more
stringent measures to deal with a problem that is common for the
whole Union. This conclusion raises concern especially in the con-
text of microplastics that cause problems worldwide. Such a strict
assessment may lead to the situation in which the more wide-
spread the environmental problem is, the less likely it is that a
Member State will succeed in its application for derogation.73
From the point of view of environmental protection, this kind of
result may run counter to the aim of the Union of providing a
high level of protection for the environment.74
The final factor having a decisive influence under the notification
procedure is the proportionality analysis. To this end, the notifying
Member State must convince the Commission that the measure is
neither a means of arbitrary discrimination nor a disguised restriction
on trade between Member States, and that it does not create an
obstacle to the functioning of the internal market under Article
61Commission Decision 2001/570/EC on draft national provisions notified by the Federal
Republic of Germany on limitations on the marketing and use of organostannic compounds
[2001] OJ L202/36 para 71.
62ibid para 73.
63MG Doherty, ‘The Application of Article 95(4)–(6) of the EC Treaty: Is the Emperor Still
Unclothed?’ (2008) 7 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 48, 56.
64Joined Cases T‐366/03 and T‐235/04, Land Öberösterreich and Austria v Commission, ECLI:
EU:T:2005:347 para 65.
65ibid.
66See, for example, Commission Decision of 18 April 2012 extending the period referred to
in Article 114(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in relation to
national provisions concerning the maximum admissible content of cadmium in fertilisers
notified by the Kingdom of Sweden pursuant to Article 114(5) of the TFEU [2012] OJ
L116/29 para 52.
67Joined Cases C‐439/05 P and C‐454/05 P, Land Oberösterreich and Austria v Commission,
Opinion of AG Sharpston, ECLI:EU:C:2007:285 para 56.
68ibid para 134.
69Land Oberösterreich and Austria v Commission (n 64) paras 66–67; P, Land Oberösterreich
and Austria v Commission (n 67) paras 63–64; JH Jans et al, ‘Environmental Spill‐overs into
General Community Law’ (2008) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 1360, 1371.
70Commission (EU), ‘Commission Communication Concerning Article 95 (paras 4, 5, and 6)
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community’ COM (2002)760 final, 23 December
2002 Annex II, 3(b).
71Commission Decision 2001/570/EC on draft national provisions notified by the Federal
Republic of Germany on limitations on the marketing and use of organostannic compounds
[2001] OJ L202/36 para 73.
72Case T‐182/06, Netherlands v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:191 para 62.
73H Sevenster, ‘The Environmental Guarantee after Amsterdam: Does the Emperor Have
New Clothes?’ (2000) 1 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 291, 302.
74TFEU (n 39) art 191(2).
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114(6) TFEU. The judicial review is limited to verifying that the
national measure is not manifestly inappropriate.75 However, the
Commission's level of scrutiny suggests a very restrictive interpreta-
tion. It seems that the Commission has a clear preference for the
integrity of harmonization measures, which is confirmed by its deci-
sion in reply to the German application for a derogation on the use
of azodyes.76 The Commission noted that the new EU legislation
had already taken into consideration the evidence put forward by
Germany and that the legislator had made the decision to impose
restrictions only where there was enough data showing the exist-
ence of risks.77 Consequently, the German request for a measure
imposing a higher level of protection was rejected and prevalence
was given to the risk management choice made at the Union level.78
This kind of preference clearly reduces the scope left for the Mem-
ber States’ action under the derogation clause also in the case of
microplastics, as Member States’ risk management choices are not
seen as relevant as those made by the Union.
4 | AN EU BAN ON MICROPLASTICS AS A
TECHNICAL MEASURE UNDER WTO LAW
So far, eight countries have notified the TBT Committee of the
WTO regarding their legislation on microplastics in cosmetic prod-
ucts. There is no doubt that an EU ban must also be notified
under the TBT Agreement, as all proposed restrictions under
REACH are being notified.79 REACH itself was notified in 2004
and, although many concerns were raised by non‐European WTO
Members, in particular regarding the registration obligation for
entering the market, REACH as a regulatory framework was not
challenged.80
Restrictions under REACH could potentially conflict with WTO
rules in the TBT Agreement and in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994.81 Both documents deal with non‐tariff barriers, the
GATT 1994 in general, and TBT Agreement more specifically regard-
ing technical measures.82 We primarily focus on consistency with
the TBT Agreement as the more specific agreement, but will also
address consistency with GATT 1994, if applicable.83 The objectives
of the WTO in general are to promote international trade by
liberalization, by means of non‐discrimination rules, reduction of
trade barriers, rules on unfair trade and a rule‐based dispute settle-
ment system. The TBT Agreement, more specifically, seeks to ‘en-
sure that technical regulations … do not create unnecessary
obstacles to international trade’.84 The WTO specifically recognizes
the right to regulate. The preamble of the TBT Agreement states
that ‘no country should be prevented from taking measures … for
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the envi-
ronment … at the levels it considers appropriate’.85 WTO members
are free to regulate as long as the measures comply with the WTO
rules and, in case of a restriction under REACH, in particular with
the requirements set out in the TBT Agreement.86 This understand-
ing is confirmed by the Appellate Body (AB) in case law, most promi-
nently in US – Clove Cigarettes, in which it stated that ‘the object
and purpose of the TBT Agreement is to strike a balance between,
on the one hand, the objective of trade liberalization and, on the
other hand, Members’ right to regulate’.87
Article 2 of the TBT Agreement provides the key obligations with
which a technical regulation has to comply: the non‐discrimination
obligation, the obligation to refrain from creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade and the obligation to base techni-
cal regulation on international standards.88 According to Mavroidis,
this process should be seen as WTO members taking ‘the first
steps toward “rationalizing” their regulatory interventions’.89
In the following section, we apply these criteria to a possible EU
restriction on microplastics, being aware that this assessment is
highly speculative. We focus on an EU ban under REACH, though
national legislation as well as voluntary standards on microplastics in
cosmetics should pass the same tests. The purpose is merely to iden-
tify what concerns may arise when employing more encompassing
or limited definitions of microplastics and application to other cate-
gories of cosmetic products. Case law, in particular on the TBT
Agreement, provides further guidance for the test of conformity with
WTO rules.
4.1 | The EU ban on microplastics as a technical
regulation
In EC – Asbestos, the French prohibition of asbestos and products
containing asbestos fibres was challenged by Canada. One of the
issues was whether the prohibition qualified as a technical regulation
under the TBT Agreement, and the AB referred to three essential
75Case C‐331, Fedesa, ECLI:EU:C:1990:391; Maletic (n 45) 172.
76Commission Decision 2003/829 concerning national provisions on the use of azodyes
notified by Germany and Article 95(4) of the EC Treaty [2003] OJ L311/46.
77ibid para 41.
78ibid; Vos and Weimer (n 46) 323.
79For an overview of notifications by the EU of REACH related measures, see Technical
Barriers to Trade Information Management System, search ‘REACH’ and ‘European Union’
<http://tbtims.wto.org/en/Notifications/Search>.
80LA Kogan, ‘REACH and International Trade Law’ in Bergkamp (n 35) 314.
81General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1
January 1995) 1867 UNTS 187.
82WTO Panel, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing
Asbestos (18 September 2000) WT/DS135/R para 8.16.
83ibid para 8.17.
84TBT Agreement (n 3) preamble.
85ibid.
86B Rigod, Optimal Regulation and the Law of International Trade: The Interface between the
Right to Regulate and WTO Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 156.
87WTO AB, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (4
April 2012) WT/DS406/AB/R (US – Clove Cigarettes) para 174.
88P Van den Bossche and W Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization:
Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press 2017) 899.
89PC Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade: The WTO Agreements on Trade in
Goods (MIT Press 2016) 378.
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features of a technical regulation: reference to an identifiable prod-
uct, description of product characterizations and demanding manda-
tory compliance.90
Regarding an EU ban on microplastics, this issue will raise min-
imal debate. The national bans have been notified consistently, with
the exception of the US Microbead‐free Waters Act of 2015, as a
technical measure, being applicable to certain cosmetic products,
namely, to rinse‐off products. Even if microplastics are banned as a
substance in any product, rather than as an ingredient of certain
products, the prohibition could be seen as a technical measure, as
was confirmed by the AB in EC – Asbestos.91 Only if all microplastics
are totally banned in their natural state – as in a plain ban – without
further references to products, a situation that is highly unlikely at
this stage, one could question whether the element of identifiable
product would be satisfied.92 In that case, only the GATT 1994 pro-
visions, in particular Article I on most‐favoured‐nation (MFN) treat-
ment, Article III on national treatment, Article XI on quantitative
restrictions and Article XX on general exceptions, would apply. It
should be noted that even if a measure is consistent with the TBT
Agreement, measures could still be inconsistent with GATT 1994. As
indicated above, in this article we limit our analysis to consistency
with the TBT Agreement.
Regarding the criterion of product characterization, all national
bans lay down product characterizations, such as the size of the
plastic particle and the function of rinse‐off products. An EU ban on
microplastics would, by defining microplastics and categories of
products, fulfil this requirement. The third feature, mandatory com-
pliance, is satisfied by the nature of the procedure under REACH: a
restriction in the meaning of Article 67 REACH is a mandatory meas-
ure per se.
4.2 | Non‐discrimination principles
The non‐discrimination principles of national treatment and MFN
treatment are included in Article 2(1) TBT Agreement, which sets
out that ‘in respect of technical regulations, products imported from
the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and
to like products originating in any other country’.93 Two steps can
be distinguished: first, it has to be determined whether the relevant
products are ‘like’; and, second, if so, whether the measure treats
them ‘no less favourable’.94
In US – Clove Cigarettes, the AB made a clear statement regarding
the determination of ‘likeness’. The issue at hand was whether clove
and menthol cigarettes were like products, as clove cigarettes were
prohibited and menthol cigarettes were not. In the panel report, like-
ness was determined by focusing on the objectives and purposes of
the technical regulation. However, the AB chose to follow the com-
petition‐based approach, which is also used in the context of the
GATT 1994 provisions. The AB stated that ‘the concept of “treat-
ment no less favourable” links the products to the marketplace,
because it is only in the marketplace that it can be determined how
the measure treats like imported and domestic products’.95 The AB
further referred to the considerations made in EC – Asbestos regard-
ing physical characteristics and consumer preferences, including evi-
dence relating to health risks, which was the underlying concern of
the measure.96 In EC – Asbestos, Canada claimed that its products
with asbestos fibres should be considered as like products, though
the AB found on the basis of health considerations that the physical
properties of the products were very different, which would influ-
ence consumers’ behaviour, and therefore products with asbestos
fibres could not be seen as like.97 The AB in US – Clove Cigarettes
concluded that regulatory concerns underlying a measure ‘may be
relevant to an analysis of the “likeness” criteria under Article III:4 of
the GATT 1994, as well as under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement,
to the extent they have an impact on the competitive relationship
between and among the products concerned’.98
Applying this analysis to a possible EU ban on microplastics, we
can observe several issues. While it might be true that the physical
properties of products with microplastics will be different with
regard to environmental impact, the competition‐based approach of
the AB in US – Clove Cigarettes will most probably lead to the finding
that products with microplastics will be considered as like products.
Most consumers are not aware of the presence of microplastics in
cosmetic products. This is even truer for different types of
microplastics in case the definition in the EU ban would diverge from
more commonly used definitions.
The second step is then to assess whether the like product is
treated less favourable, covering both de jure and de facto discrimin-
ation. The AB in US – Clove Cigarettes referred to the case law estab-
lished regarding Article III(4) GATT 1994 for the interpretation of
‘treatment no less favourable’ in Article 2(1) TBT Agreement.99 Also,
‘the context and object and purpose of the TBT Agreement weigh in
favour of interpreting the “treatment no less favourable” requirement
of Article 2.1 as not prohibiting detrimental impact on imports that
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction’.100 There-
fore, it should be further analysed ‘whether the detrimental impact
on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction
90WTO AB, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing
Asbestos (12 March 2001) WT/DS135/AB/R (EC – Asbestos) para 66; M Koebele, ‘Article 1
and Annex 1 TBT’ in R Wolfrum, PT Stoll and A Seibert‐Fohr (eds), WTO: Technical Barriers
and SPS Measures (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 187.
91EC – Asbestos (n 90) para 70.
92R Howse and E Tuerk, ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations: A Case Study of the
Canada–EC Asbestos Dispute’ in G De Búrca and J Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal
and Constitutional Issues (Hart 2001) 307.
93TBT Agreement (n 3) art 2(1).
94L Tamiotti, ‘Article 2 TBT’ in R Wolfrum et al (n 90) 215; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n
88) 901.
95US – Clove Cigarettes (n 87) para 111.
96ibid para 118.
97EC – Asbestos (n 90) paras 121–126.
98US – Clove Cigarettes (n 87) para 119.
99ibid para 180.
100ibid para 181.
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rather than reflecting discrimination against the group of prod-
ucts’.101 The question is whether the measure ‘is designed and
applied in an even‐handed manner’102 and ‘the particular circum-
stances’ of the case, including the ‘design architecture, revealing
structure, operation, and application’ of the measure, should be scru-
tinized.103
Hence, it should be examined whether an EU ban would dis-
criminate against imported products. If a detrimental impact on
non‐EU cosmetic products is observed, it may not be considered
discriminatory if it is based on a legitimate regulatory distinction.
An EU ban should therefore be designed and applied in an even‐
handed manner. The process of restriction under REACH may be
essential in that respect. It has been observed that the approach of
the Commission, such as early notification, extensive consultation,
revision and negotiations, to concerns relating to the adoption of
REACH, could explain the absence of challenges by non‐EU WTO
members.104 The restriction process on microplastics includes sev-
eral formal and informal consultations, open to any interested
party. Restriction dossiers include numerous analyses and assess-
ments in order to justify a restriction under REACH, which will not
be different for the restriction dossier on microplastics. The process
and dossier may provide the ‘rationalization’ for intervening with
free trade and the information collected could be elemental in case
the restriction would be challenged. Yet, the factual operation and
application of the restriction towards imported like products
remains decisive.
4.3 | The ‘not more trade‐restrictive than
necessary’ test
Article 2(2) TBT Agreement sets further conditions for WTO‐
consistent technical measures by requiring that these shall ‘not be
more trade‐restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective
taking account of the risks non‐fulfilment would create’.105 This test
is not about whether the measure is trade‐restrictive or not, but
about whether it is more trade‐restrictive than necessary.106
As the phrase suggests, the measure should fulfil a legitimate
objective, which includes ‘the protection of human health or safety,
animal or plant life or health, or the environment’.107 According the
AB in EC – Seal Products, the articulation of the objective pursued
should be considered, though ‘all evidence … including “the texts of
statutes, legislative history, and other evidence regarding the
structure and operation”’ should be taken into account.108 Further-
more, ‘a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures ne-
cessary to achieve its legitimate objectives “at the levels it considers
appropriate”’, though the measure should also be examined as to
whether it, ‘as written and applied, actually contributes to the
achievement of the legitimate objective pursued by the Member’.109
As all evidence has to be taken into account, the question arises
whether there is room for the application of the precautionary prin-
ciple in case there are uncertainties or gaps in scientific evidence.
The TBT Agreement does not explicitly mention the precautionary
principle, or a situation of insufficient evidence, like the Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) does.110 In
EC – Hormones the AB concluded that although there might be some
relationship between the precautionary principle and the SPS Agree-
ment, it cannot override its provisions.111 While the precautionary
principle has not been addressed by a panel or the AB in relation to
the TBT Agreement, there seems to be some room for the applica-
tion in the terms ‘legitimate objective’ and ‘assessment of risks’ in
Article 2(2) of the TBT Agreement.112 The case law on the SPS
Agreement shows, however, that this space is minimal and we do
not expect that this will be different for the TBT Agreement.113
Regarding the national bans on microplastics, in the notifica-
tion documents, all except the ones from South Korea referring
to ‘protection of human health’, indicate ‘the protection of the
environment’ as the objective of the measure, some of them
referring to scientific studies. France also refers to international
obligations regarding protection of the environment, such as the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North‐East Atlantic
(OSPAR Convention). The Commission requested the preparation
of the restriction dossier on microplastics relying on ‘a threat to
the aquatic environment’,114 and this objective is expected to be
substantiated in the restriction dossier in a comprehensive man-
ner.
The same will be true regarding the examination of alternative
measures. In Korea – Beef, the issue of alternative measures was dis-
cussed as part of the assessment whether a measure was necessary
under Article XX(d) GATT 1994.115 The AB further explained in US –
101ibid para 182.
102Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 88) 908; US – Clove Cigarettes (n 87) para 182; WTO AB,
United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (29 June 2012) WT/
DS384/AB/R and WT/DS386/AB/R (US – COOL) para 340.
103US – COOL (n 102) para 271.
104Kogan (n 80) 314.
105TBT Agreement (n 3) art 2(2).
106Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 88) 914; WTO AB, European Communities – Measures
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (22 May 2014) WT/DS400/AB/R
and WT/DS401/AB/R (EC – Seal Products) para 5.144.
107TBT Agreement (n 3) art 2(2).
108EC – Seal Products (n 106) para 5.144.
109US – COOL (n 102) para 373.
110Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (adopted 15 April 1994, entered
into force 1 January 1995) (SPS Agreement) 1867 UNTS 493 art 5.
111WTO AB, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones) (16 January 1997) WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R para 124.
112See J Zander, The Application of the Precautionary Principle: Comparative Dimensions
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 40, 57, 72–75.
113CF Foster, ‘Precaution, Scientific Development and Scientific Uncertainty under the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ (2009) 18 Review of European
Community and International Environmental Law 50, 58.
114European Commission, ‘Note for the attention of Mr G. Dancet, Executive Director,
ECHA’ Ref. Ares(2017)5463573 (9 November 2017).
115WTO AB, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (11 Decem-
ber 2000) WT/DS161/AB/R and WT/DS169/AB/R.
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Tuna II (Mexico) that ‘[i]n most cases, a comparison of the challenged
measure and possible alternative measure should be undertaken’.116
Arguments and evidence should be presented whether the alterna-
tive measure is less trade‐restrictive, makes an equivalent contribu-
tion to the relevant objective and is reasonably available. The AB
deliberated that:
the obligation to consider ‘the risks non-fulfilment would
create’ suggests that the comparison of the challenged
measure with a possible alternative measure should be
made in the light of nature of the risks at issue and the
gravity of the consequences that would arise from non-
fulfilment of the legitimate objective. This suggests a fur-
ther element of weighing and balancing.…117
A rather similar exercise has to be carried out as part of the
restriction dossier and process under REACH.118 In the restriction
dossier on microplastics, currently being prepared by ECHA, an
impact assessment is included to justify the restriction at a Union‐
wide level, as the most appropriate measure. A section identifying
the risk management options, including alternative measures, is
required. For the restriction dossier on microplastics, part of this
exercise has already been carried out by a preparatory study on
microplastics, in the form of a risk assessment, including a risk man-
agement options analysis.119
In case a more encompassing ban is established, for example, by
using a broader definition of microplastics than in existing national
bans or by including more product categories, the trade‐restrictiveness
test will be more challenging. While a restriction on microplastics in
cosmetic products undoubtedly leads to less microplastics in the envir-
onment, it remains to be seen, in relative terms, what the effect is on
microplastic pollution in general. Successful voluntary initiatives phas-
ing out certain microplastics in certain products and the limited contri-
bution of cosmetic products to microplastic pollution in general could
be aspects to consider within the balancing process. While we con-
clude below that no international standards exist, scientific consensus
on the harmfulness of microplastics and the level of protection may
contribute to establishing a certain level of protection as legitimate
objective. This should be substantiated with data.
Although the WTO requires an assessment of the actual applied
measure, we think the restriction dossier and process serves as a
good preparation for a challenge under the WTO agreements.
4.4 | International standards
As the preamble of the TBT Agreement points out, international
standards contribute and facilitate the conduct of international trade,
thereby explicitly encouraging harmonization.120 Article 2(4) TBT
Agreement requires that international standards should be used as a
basis for technical regulation, except when these standards would be
ineffective or inappropriate. In two cases, the conformity of technical
measures has been assessed on the conformity with international
standards. In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the AB deliberated at length on
the definition of standards and the international standardizing body,
requiring that these bodies should be open to all WTO members.121
Reference was made to a dolphin‐safe standard, developed under a
regional treaty, but the AB stated that this organization did not sat-
isfy the requirement of being ‘international’, and thus not being able
to develop international standards within the meaning of the TBT
Agreement. So, although ‘standards’ may include rules, guidelines or
recommendations, the threshold for being ‘international’ is rather
high. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the definitions used in
national regulations, such as those on microplastics, could function
as international standards, even in case these regulations use the
same standard. Also, an EU restriction measure on microplastics, har-
monizing the EU market, would not qualify as an international
standard. While plastic pollution has recently received increased
attention, both within the EU as outside, no initiative for global
regulation on microplastics has been taken so far. Voluntary initia-
tives of the industry pertain to phasing out certain solid microplas-
tics in rinse‐off cosmetic products, in Australia and Europe.122
Nongovernmental organizations and scientists have criticized the
narrow definition of microplastics and limited category of products.
Hence, we conclude that no international standards regarding
microplastics exist that could be used as a basis for an EU ban.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
The increasing number of unilateral regulations on microplastics,
together with the notifications of these measures under the technical
measures notification procedures in the EU and WTO, have provoked
questions regarding their compatibility within these regimes. This
article has examined how an EU ban on microplastics would affect the
right to regulate of the EU Member States and of the EU itself, and
likewise for individual States, within the WTO system.
The unilateral measures so far, as well as the preparatory docu-
ments for an EU restriction procedure, show that there is no consen-
sus on the definition and on the categories to which a restriction
should apply. Although several proposals have been based on the US
Microbead‐free Waters Act of 2015, which also put an end to
diverging state‐level legislation, the consultation process for a pos-
sible EU restriction shows that an EU ban may include a different
definition and other categories of products.
116WTO AB, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of
Tuna and Tuna Products (16 May 2012) WT/DS381/AB/R para 322.
117ibid para 321.
118REACH (n 5) Annex XV.
119Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited (n 34) 45.
120TBT Agreement (n 3) preamble; US – Tuna II (Mexico) (n 116) para 379.
121US – Tuna II (Mexico) (n 116) paras 343–401.
122Accord Australasia, BeadRecede, <https://accord.asn.au/sustainability/beadrecede/>;
Cosmetic Europe, ‘Press Release Cosmetic Europe, Recommendation on Solid Plastic Par-
ticles (Plastic Micro Particles)’ (21 October 2015).
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Concerning the regulatory autonomy within the EU, we conclude
that the Member States’ right to regulate first of all depends on the
scope of harmonization. Therefore, Member States’ scope for regula-
tory action on microplastics in the EU is largely dependent on the
definition that will be adopted under REACH. In case the national
and REACH definitions on microplastics are identical, no problems
are likely to arise. By contrast, if an all‐encompassing definition is
used at the EU level, the Member States’ scope for action is limited
to the situations covered by the derogation clauses of Articles
114(4) and (5) TFEU and Article 129(1) REACH.
On the basis of Article 114(4) TFEU, there seems to be room for
maintaining in force current regulations on microplastics. Stricter
national measures may be justified on environmental grounds. So far,
the Court and the Commission have adopted a quite lenient
approach to Article 114(4) TFEU. This is in contrast with the Com-
mission's approach to Article 114(5) TFEU, regulating national provi-
sions after the adoption of a Union harmonization measure, for
which the legal scope seems very small. The Member States’ right to
further regulate microplastics turns out, at least in case of full har-
monization, to be seriously constrained. Moreover, since the obliga-
tion to compile a restriction dossier under Article 129(1) REACH is
likely to discourage Member States from resorting to REACH in
urgent situations, Member States’ possibilities for further regulation
of microplastics seem limited. Although understandable from the
point of view of the rationale for harmonization, the question can be
raised whether EU Member States are able to respond to arising
environmental problems caused by microplastics.
With regard to international trade obligations, we found that an
EU ban on microplastics would most probably qualify as a technical
measure under the TBT Agreement. No de jure or de facto discrimina-
tory distinction of non‐EU products should be made, while the
process of restriction should be open and transparent. Based on the
competition‐based approach of the AB, cosmetic products with and
without microplastics will be considered like products and a restriction
should be non‐discriminatory to products originating outside the EU,
both on paper and in practice. It seems that such a distinction is not
made by any of the national bans and an EU ban should follow this
practice.
Applying the ‘not more trade‐restrictive than necessary’ test, the
outcome regarding an EU ban is less predictable due to a variety of
definitions and product categories that can be adopted. The REACH
restriction procedure, including the comprehensive requirements of
the restriction dossier, may anticipate the balancing and weighing of
the test, though the actual operation and application of the measure
remain decisive. Departure from more frequently used definitions
and categories of products might require additional justification in
relation to the legitimate objective and alternative measures. Scien-
tific evidence, also in the absence of international standards, could
become essential in this respect.
Hence, the design of a restriction dossier under REACH, includ-
ing a comprehensive impact and risk assessment of the proposed
restriction and substantiated with scientific evidence, may anticipate
a challenge at the WTO. But at the same time, it may deter EU
Member States from implementing further national measures, as the
compilation of the dossier is perceived being too burdensome. We
come to the conclusion that the wider the scope of an EU ban, the
more demanding it will be to satisfy the conditions of a legitimate
technical measure under the WTO. A wide scope in an EU ban,
implicating a higher level of harmonization, may also constrain the
possibilities for EU Member States to adopt stricter national meas-
ures. We recommend that careful consideration should be given to
these issues when defining the scope of the restriction on microplas-
tics in the current restriction process under REACH.
A final point is that the availability of scientific evidence is essen-
tial for the risk assessments that are required in both regimes.
Uncertainties and gaps in evidence regarding the effects of
microplastics on the environment and on human health may prevent
the adoption of more restrictive measures, as the precautionary prin-
ciple plays only a minor, not to say negligible, role in both regimes.
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